

No. 8

ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE "CIA REVIEW OF THE WORLD SITUATION"

ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE "CIA REVIEW OF THE WORLD SITUATION"<sup>1</sup>

1. Character of the Review

The Dulles-Jackson-Correa Report to the National Security Council on the "Central Intelligence Agency and National Organization for Intelligence" (1 January 1949) contains only one reference to the Central Intelligence Agency "Review of the World Situation." This appears on page 85 and is as follows:

"Still another periodical publication is the monthly 'Review of the World Situation.'"

This statement follows two paragraphs discussing the Daily and Weekly Summaries of current intelligence which are described as "fragmentary," generally inadequate, and likely to mislead recipients. Their discontinuance is recommended by the Committee. Although this criticism is not made to apply specifically to the "Review," one could only conclude from Chapter VI of the Dulles-Jackson Report either that the "Review," as "another periodical publication," must be considered subject to the same objections as the Daily and Weekly or that it was considered not important enough to merit comment.

It is to be assumed that the Dulles-Jackson-Correa Committee and its investigators studied the fourteen issues of the "Review" in existence when the Report was submitted, with the same care that they exercised respecting other aspects of the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Organization for Intelligence; yet it seems surprising that they did not choose to say more about the "Review" in consequence of their study.

For example, the first issue (CIA-1, September 26, 1947) resembles,

**II/1**

1. Published each month from September 17, 1947 - December 15, 1950 (minus October, 1947). Until July, 1948 called "Review of the World Situation as it Relates to the Security of the United States." This study is based on the issues from September, 1947 through December, 1949. It does not include any of the issues published during 1950.

**II/2**

1. Dulles-Jackson Report, p. 75

in many particulars, the Ad Hoc Committee estimate of 16 March 1948 singled out by the Committee (on page 74) as "The most significant exception to a rather general failure to coordinate intelligence opinion." Both these papers were written under emergency conditions; they both arrived at the same conclusion about Soviet intentions, and they both had the benefit of inter-agency agreement by ad hoc committee.

Succeeding issues of the "Review" were not coordinated. They would not measure up to the Committee's requirement as estimates that "establish their (the agencies') collective responsibility for the estimate", though it might be fair to say, in the case of any given issue, that "all the interested agencies have contributed to consideration of the situation."<sup>1</sup> All in all, however, with the exception of CIA-1, the "Review" does not represent "coordinated national intelligence" as the term is used by the Dulles-Jackson Committee, nor did it even go through the formal coordination channels used for the CIA "studies and estimates" tried and found wanting by the Committee on page 71.

It does not seem altogether accurate, nevertheless, to lump the "Review" with the Daily and Weekly Summaries as "another periodical," thus implying that there was no essential difference between them. The "Review" became a "periodical" more or less by chance, and remained a "periodical" by virtue of the fact that it was published periodically. It never became what it might have been, however, and what the Committee may have believed it to be---a digest of current events that had been previously recorded in the two Summaries.

The "Review" is a sustained national intelligence estimate, based upon a well developed and clearly stated concept of what constitutes a

national estimate, carried on from month to month, and varied as to topic and emphasis in accordance with the development of the world situation. As an official publication during 1947-50, the "Review" simultaneously served two purposes: it reflected and brought into relation with current world developments such official "coordinated" estimates as were produced by Central Intelligence; and it offered the best estimates that the Central Intelligence Agency, working informally with the Agencies, could formulate when such official views were lacking. In this way, the "Review" contributed a certain timeliness in the field of intelligence estimates which was beyond the capabilities of "coordination."

The "Review of the World Situation" is probably unique in the history of the Central Intelligence Agency in that it represents the only complete<sup>1</sup> series of national intelligence estimates produced without the benefit of formal inter-agency "coordination." Rather than being a publication representing "collective responsibility" it is primarily a product of Central Intelligence responsibility. At the same time, however, its estimates are based upon all information available to Central Intelligence from whatever source including all Agency sources not withheld, and takes into account opinion both in Central Intelligence and the Agencies. One difference between the "Review", and publications produced under the "coordination" system, is that the "Review's" estimates were not affected by the "particular policy" of any department, and were seldom if ever seriously modified to effect compromises between divergent departmental views. Thus the "Review" is probably open to most objections ordinarily applied to "...an independent producer of national intelligence."<sup>2</sup>

**II/3**

- 1. Certain individual "ORE" and "IM" estimates are likewise not truly coordinated papers.**
- 2. See Dulles-Jackson Report**

**II/4**

- 1. Oral information from A. B. Darling**

2. Origin of the "Review"

The birth of the "Review" coincided with that of Central Intelligence as an Agency of the government, and of the National Security Council. Its originator seems to have been Mr. Sidney Souers, the first Secretary of the National Security Council, who may have acquired the idea from Defense Secretary Forrestal. Souers believed that a policy-making body like the Council should be given a thorough intelligence briefing before beginning its discussions. Hence, when the Council met for the first time to discuss foreign policy, Mr. Souers arranged to have the Director of Central Intelligence give an oral intelligence briefing. The Central Intelligence Agency Office of Reports and Estimates was called upon to prepare the notes for this briefing, with an extremely short deadline. These "notes", which took the form of a full-fledged intelligence estimate of the world situation, became the first issue of the "Review" with the title "Review of the World Situation as it relates to the Security of the United States" and the short title "CIA-1".<sup>1</sup>

It is probable that Admiral Hillenkoetter actually used "CIA-1" as the basis of an oral briefing before the National Security Council and that this paper thus became the starting point for the Council's discussions at its September 17th meeting. The same may be true of the second issue which was produced (on November 14, 1947) in response to another last-minute request.

Thereafter, the Director did not deliver oral briefings, but finished copies of the monthly were delivered to his office far enough ahead of the current National Security Council meeting to give the Director time for advance study of the paper. At the meeting copies were distributed to

the members who might and might not read them.

After the first two rush requests, the production of the "Review" began gradually to settle down into a system. The first two papers made enough of an impression on the Council to evoke the suggestion that similar world reviews be furnished for each meeting thereafter. Because this plan would have required Central Intelligence to produce a world estimate every two weeks, the Agency objected, and a compromise was reached under which a regular estimate, of the character of the first two, was to be expected for the meeting to be held on the third Thursday of each month.

Thus, rather by accident, the Central Intelligence Agency acquired a monthly periodical which had not been contemplated and which otherwise would not have been published. The "Review" was prevented from developing into a routine survey of current intelligence partly through the character of its editors and partly by virtue of its origin. Through almost all of the "Review's" history---in spite of the fact that they could never be sure whether or to what extent the National Security Council members took notice of their efforts---the editors never lost sight of the fact that their publication---in theory at least---was intended as an intelligence briefing for the Council. They framed each issue accordingly.

### 3. Method of Producing the "Review"

To an unusual degree for an intelligence publication any given issue of the "Review" was the product of the individual in charge of that issue.<sup>1</sup> It is therefore, perhaps, worth while to mention the names of

IX/5

1. This is by no means to say that the editors should take sole credit for any success the "Review" may have attained, for the "Review" was very much a product of combined CIA effort. Almost every analyst in the Office of Reports and Estimates should share equally with the editors in this respect.

the five men who edited the publication. The first two issues (the rush requests of September and November, 1947) were produced almost single handed by Mr. Ludwell Montague who was also the author of "ORE-1" to which they bear a resemblance. Thereafter until mid-1948 Montague was primarily responsible for most of the monthly reviews but continued to receive the assistance of [redacted] who produced several issues in Montague's absence. In about July, 1948, [redacted] was assigned the duty of producing the "Review", and he may be considered as practically sole author, under Montague's supervision, of most subsequent issues up until 1950 when Mr. Ray Gline succeeded him. A few issues late in 1950 were edited by [redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

Ordinarily, the one of these individuals responsible for a given issue of the "Review" wrote the whole draft. For information, he had access to all intelligence that was received by Central Intelligence and the advice of area experts, chiefly within Central Intelligence. The finished draft, having been discussed with the other editors, received the comments of the relevant Central Intelligence analysts and of anyone else whose services might be appropriate. The draft was modified accordingly. Before it was finally published, the paper was also read by a reviewer who, however, was mainly concerned with routine proof-reading. Publication required prior approval by the Assistant Director, Reports and Estimates, but he seldom offered any comments. As noted above, the Director had time to study the draft, but if he made changes in it they were never brought to the attention of the producers.

When, to the above account, is added the fact that the "Review" did not undergo the usual process of "inter-agency coordination", it can be

seen that the estimates involved enjoyed an unusual opportunity to go from producer to consumer, unscathed by intermediate opinion. This is not by any means to say, however, that the "Review" floated sublimely from an ivory tower straight into the hands of the National Security Council. All issues of the "Review" were based solidly upon all intelligence available to the United States government, whether received directly by Central Intelligence or by way of the other Agencies. Agency intelligence interpretation (as distinct from Agency "views") was reflected in the publication because Central Intelligence analysts, as well as the "Review's" editors, were in constant consultation with agency specialists. Although the "Review" did not have to satisfy any Reviewing Authority similar to the present National Estimates Board, and although it was apparently not a matter of serious concern of the Assistant Director or the Director, it was subjected to the scrutiny of regional analysts who were well qualified to detect misstatements of the "ivory tower" type.

One difference between the "Review" and other intelligence publications involving national estimates lay in its relative freedom from external or internal dictation. As an officially uncoordinated publication, it enjoyed reasonable latitude in expressing conclusions reached by the editors regardless of modifications desired by the Agencies. Although the review could not be published without regard to the opinion of regional analysts, it was on the whole allowed greater freedom in this respect than any of the other Central Intelligence publications. The very fact that the "Review's" editors normally wrote first drafts which

II/8

1. Montague to the AD/R&E, February 16, 1949 (in LLM  
"Souvenirs of G/GS")
2. Cf. Dulles-Jackson Report, p. 86: "...the various agencies often feel that it is an imposition to be burdened with responsibility of reviewing these documents, making appropriate comments and noting concurrence or dissent."
3. The ensuing account is based upon a conversation with Mr. Montague of January 29, 1953 and upon his memorandum to the AD/ORE of February 16, 1949 relating to the coordination of the "Review." It will be necessary from here on to refer to the various issues of the Review by their short title: CIA-1, 2, etc.

-8-

were submitted to the analysts for comments---rather than the reverse which was normally the case---was itself an advantage.

All in all, the "Review" may be said to have come unexpectedly close to being what Montague hoped it would be: "...a responsible synthesis and interpretation of the developing global situation, written with cognizance of departmental views, but with independent judgment...".  
<sup>1</sup>

#### 4. The "Review" and Inter-agency Coordination

When the Central Intelligence Agency proposed to relieve the Agencies of the burdens they complained of in the coordination of "Situation Reports", (see No. ) the Agencies declined, obviously because they feared the effects of such uncoordinated Central Intelligence estimates as might appear in the Reports. Yet, 80% of the content of most "Situation Reports" was basic intelligence, no more controversial than the Encyclopedia Britannica. The "Review" consisted preponderantly of sheer estimates. Nevertheless, the "Review" was published without the benefit of interagency coordination for three years, and the evidence seems to show that the Agencies not only allowed it to go unchallenged but were happy to be relieved of the burden of "coordination."  
<sup>2</sup>

When the National Security Council requested that resulted in "CIA-1" (the first issue of the "review") devolved upon Mr. Montague, he made every effort to gain Agency concurrence in the paper, despite the pressure of time resulting from the suddenness of the demand. In effect, Montague assembled a makeshift "ad-hoc committee" of agency representatives who participated in formulating the estimate and agreed in it. According to his testimony,  
<sup>3</sup> CIA-1 may be considered to be a "coordinated" paper.

In another sense, however, even CIA-1 cannot be considered to be "fully coordinated", for no formal memoranda of concurrence were signed by the Agency chiefs. CIA-1 had "concurrence" only at the "sub-Director" level which, in practice, was not enough. The publication furthermore does not carry a footnote testifying to the extent of coordination.

The second issue of the "Review" was, according to Montague's statement, even less nearly a coordinated paper than CIA-1. The deadline here was even shorter than the first. In the brief time allowed, Montague consulted agency representatives, but he did not consider the results sufficient to constitute "coordination." CIA-2, like CIA-1, carries no "coordination" footnote.

Issues after the first two carry such notes. At the bottom of page 1 of CIA-3 a note reads: "The present text has been prepared after consideration of comments by the intelligence organization of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy and the Air Force, on a preliminary draft." Such a statement cannot, however, be taken to mean very much. CIA-4 is even more elusive on the same subject, saying only that a "preliminary draft" had been "furnished" to the agencies. CIA-5 says the same thing in different words, but CIA 3-4C, which followed it, stated: "This estimate has not been coordinated with the intelligence organizations..." Not only is this point made in the usual place, on page 1 of CIA 3-4C, but it appears again on an especially printed slip, stapled (obviously after publication) to the cover so that no unsuspecting person could even open the booklet without knowing that he was about to deal with "uncoordinated" intelligence. This development would seem to indicate alarm on the part of someone who must have perceived that the "Review" was hardly "reportorial", "current" intelligence. This warning sign

was used only once, however, and by July, 1948 the trend had been reversed to such an extent that the usual first page footnote had been relegated to the inside back cover along with the routine formulae about the espionage act and the distribution list. This slight was soon corrected, (showing that the Agencies were still keeping an eye on the publication) but there was no return to the prominent warning sign, nor, with exception noted below, any demand for Agency participation.

In short, after the first two issues, no serious attempt was made to "coordinate" the "Review". It became gradually customary for Central Intelligence to produce the monthly with only such outside aid as it chose to seek and to deliver finished copies to the Director for distribution to the Security Council; then, more or less simultaneously, to furnish multigraphed copies to each Agency. Ordinarily, these copies were delivered in time to allow for perusal before the National Security Council was to meet. Thus the Intelligence Advisory Committee was not entirely ignored and was offered at least a minimum of protection against whatever deleterious effect a unilateral Central Intelligence Agency estimate might be presumed to have upon the Secretaries. With this, evidently, the Agencies were content.

Considering the intermittent storm that raged from 1946 to 1950 over the problem of uncoordinated national estimates, it seems curious that so little objection was raised to the "Review". This publication not only dealt in individual estimates, but boldly stated the theoretical basis for its analysis, a procedure potentially more "dangerous" than any individual estimate. In general, it would have seemed that if the time were ever to arrive for clamping down on the "high-handed

-11-

pronouncements of the Central Intelligence Agency, it would have been in connection with these broad statements concerning US security in general. Yet if silence gives consent, the Agencies consented to theories which seem to have brought forth dissents when they were later embodied in estimates.<sup>1</sup>

In spite of all this, the records seem to show that (a) no formal protests were entered by the responsible heads of the Intelligence Advisory Committee; (b) it was the Agencies rather than Central Intelligence that took the initiative in suspending attempts at coordination after the first two issues, and (c) when the Intelligence Advisory Committee, during the discussions of "DCI 3/1" (July 8, 1948), were given the opportunity to classify the "Review" as "staff" intelligence subject to coordination, they failed to take advantage of it. (See No. )

During the whole history of the "Review" there seems to have been only one brief flurry (and that an inconclusive one) over the question of non-coordination. It began with the following memorandum, dated February 8, 1949, to the Director from the Chief, Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff,<sup>2</sup> from which the following paragraphs, applying to the "Review," are quoted:

"We also think that the "Review of the World Situation" which is now published regularly for the National Security Council would carry a lot more weight and be more in accordance with the laws and regulations if it were coordinated at least orally in advance of publication. Formerly, there was an irregular dead-line making such a procedure too difficult, but now that it has a fixed date of publication each month, we should think that the IAC members could participate in this publication also.

The feeling that CIA has a free hand in current and staff intelligence, we think has gone too far, because the basic law and regulation under which we function give to CIA the responsibility for only national

xx/11

1. This applied most particularly to CIA O-49 which was published in anticipation of a storm that never materialized.
2. In L.L.M. "Souvenirs of G/GS"

intelligence, and the method for setting up national intelligence is participation by the various established intelligence agencies in the National Military Establishment and State. We think that CIA should stick to the rules of the game and not by-pass them. Then after we have no mote in our own eye, we can with justification get after the beam in the other fellows."

It must have occurred to Montague as editor of the Review, when he read these paragraphs, that any serious recommendations for coordination of the "Review", if adopted at this time, might lead to a complete, and very disruptive overhauling of extant procedures for producing it. This perhaps explains the scope of Mr. Montague's reply of February 16.<sup>1</sup> Nine paragraphs are devoted to an attack on Mr. Childs' reference to the "basic law and regulation under which we function."<sup>2</sup> The memorandum then goes on to outline reasons why any attempt to "coordinate" the "Review" after the fashion proposed by the Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff would be inadvisable:

"10. This agreement" (that reached in DCI 3/1 under which current intelligence was exempted from coordination) "was not reached on any basis of abstract consideration, but as a result of practical experience. Initially we undertook to coordinate items in the CIA Series as though they were items in the ORB series. CIA-1 (September, 1947) was so coordinated, at a cost in time and effort, to the agencies as well as to ourselves, far in excess of any resultant benefit. CIA-2 was not coordinated, for absolute lack of any time in which to do so. I do not recall precisely when the agencies begged off. They may well have been prompted to do so by their relief on those occasions when coordination proved impossible to accomplish for want of time. In any case, I do recall distinctly that agreement to regard the CIA Series as current intelligence was reached on agency initiative and was as much for the relief of agency analysts as for our benefit. If any agency representative now wants to resume coordination, he is presumably a headquarters character arguing in the abstract without appreciation of the practical consequences of his proposal.

"11. This observation has particular application in the case of State. One obstacle to the efficient coordination of any appreciation of global scope, such as items in the CIA Series, is the lack of any

IX/12

1. Addressed to the AD/ORE who passed it on in modified form to the Director the next day. Also in Souvenirs of G/GS
2. These paragraphs are of considerable interest as revealing one contemporary reaction to the Dulles-Jackson proposals of January, 1949 as discussed in Darling, Arthur B., THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, An Instrument of Government, 1940-1950, Chapter p.

IX/13

1. Montague here refers to a recurrent phenomenon of intelligence "coordination" orally accomplished. As changes are proposed and made in the draft of an estimate, they inevitably affect the phraseology of the whole. This soon becomes apparent to one or more members of a Coordinating Committee who thereupon begin proposing further changes having nothing to do with substance, but merely arising from a felt need for greater clarity or felicity of phrase. Purely literary preferences then begin to intrude themselves and an unreasonable amount of time is often expended in gaining agreement to mere turns of phrase which could be better handled in a few moments by any competent writer or editor.

-13-

unit in the IAC agencies comparable to G/GS. To coordinate with us in such a case OIR has to employ a team of half a dozen area specialists. Each such specialist is inclined to demand that his area be treated as though it were the sole subject of consideration. The net result is vexatious delay and diversion of effort for us and a much greater loss in man-hours for OIR, without substantial effect upon the tenor of the estimate.

\*12. The Series is presently prepared with cognizance of departmental views as conveyed to us through various media and in discussions relative to estimates in the ORE Series. Specific prior consultation with departmental specialists would consume their time and ours without contributing materially to the preparation of the initial draft. Moreover, experience shows that the comment elicited in the process of coordinating a draft of such scope and character as an item in the CIA Series is essentially editorial in character and without significant substantive effect.

\*13. It is, of course, quite feasible to coordinate items in the CIA Series as though they were items in the ORE Series, but it can be done only at considerable cost in loss of timeliness and in terms of man-hours expended, without commensurate gain. Under present procedures, which include elaborate coordination within ORE, it is necessary to write in terms of the situation existing ten days in advance of the publication date. The imposition of external coordination would require allowance of at least an additional week, very definitely impairing the timeliness of the appreciation as of its date of publication. (In this connection ICAPS should be advised that there is not, and cannot be, in real life any such thing as a meaningful oral coordination). Moreover, in view of the fact that the Global Survey Group is already experiencing difficulty in giving proper attention to its many and various commitments, the additional consumption of time (approximately one man-week) would require the provision of an additional member of the Group. These consequences could be avoided only by relieving G/GS of any responsibility for prior consultation and subsequent coordination with the Branches of ORE. This development is, indeed, the logical ultimate consequence of the position taken by ICAPS. If consultation and coordination with the departmental agencies (including consultation with half a dozen area specialists in OIR) is the controlling consideration, consultation and coordination with the Branches of ORE is unnecessary and inconsequential duplication and the best procedure would be to set up a permanent inter-departmental committee to produce the monthly review for the Security Council.

\*14. The issue is, in essence, whether the CIA Series is intended or desired to be (as we suppose) a responsible synthesis and interpretation of the developing global situation, written with cognizance of departmental views, but with independent judgment, or merely a routine joint intelligence periodical.

-14-

"15. I recommend that the Director be briefed with respect to the foregoing considerations and advised to defer decision on this incidental matter pending a basic policy decision by the NSC with respect to the doctrine enunciated by the Dulles Report and latterly copied by ICAPS in this connection. If, however, an immediate decision in conformity with the Reference is taken, I recommend that he then be advised to form at once a permanent IAC subcommittee to continue the CIA Series."

Whatever the merits of the case the Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff seems not to have pressed its point. The Director neither accepted Childs' suggestion about removing the mote from the eye of Central Intelligence, nor Montague's recommendation regarding a permanent coordinating committee. Rather, he must have gone according to Montague's first preference by deciding to "defer decision."

Nothing further came of the incident. Hence what might have become a turning point in the history of the "Review," left the publication unaffected. Following the thesis set forth in CIA O-49 (published two weeks before Childs' memorandum) the "Review's" new editor [redacted] proceeded to analyze world events, largely according to his own interpretation of them. All pretense at simple news coverage in the "Review" (if there ever had been any) was abandoned, and the periodical gradually assumed the form of an extended monthly analysis concentrating in essay form on one aspect of the total situation followed by notes on selected new developments.

25X1

BRIEF SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS REACHED IN THE "REVIEW" TO 1950

A very brief synopsis of the principal conclusions reached in the Review regarding important developments during the time of publication

-15-

is here appended as illustrative of the points made above concerning the estimative character of this publication. Further information is contained in Paper No. 10 which summarizes the twenty-eight issues under consideration.

I. The USSR

Represented the one true danger to U.S. security but in consequence of the decline of other powers incident to the war--not because its own strength had greatly increased. The USSR could be expected to follow what appeared to be an aggressive policy because (a) its government was obsessed with exaggerated concepts of security which involved an apparently offensive strategy for what might be basically defensive purposes; (b) as the most powerful nation in the center of a continent, its natural tendency would be to expand within Asia; and (c) the nature of Leninist-Stalinist doctrine was such as to involve the USSR in the equivalent of foreign aggression.

The USSR did not desire war with the United States, however, and would do nothing (depending of course on the accuracy of its own estimates) to provoke war within any period of concern predictable by Intelligence because (a) the USSR was not yet strong enough to be sure of success in such a war, (b) the Soviet government would not be disposed to risk its existence in a war whose outcome could possibly be dubious, and (c) those in control of the USSR were inclined by nature and training to "conspiratorial" rather than direct methods of aggression.

Despite what seemed to be strong evidence to the contrary, embodied in the aggressive behavior of the USSR during the height of the "cold war" in 1947-50, the "Review" throughout held to this basic view of Soviet intentions and framed its estimates accordingly.

## II. Western Europe

Because it was (a) the most highly developed industrial area in the world (outside the US and the USSR) and could therefore be most readily and quickly converted for purposes of war; (b) most easily accessible from Soviet centers of power; and (c) an area whose loss to Communism would bring incalculable world-wide repercussions from a US point of view, Western Europe was given first place among the intelligence priorities set up by the editors of the "Review". That is to say, the editors went upon the assumption (which would stand unless officially contradicted) that US strategy would be framed in terms of priority requirements for Western Europe and that intelligence estimators should bear this fact in mind in determining "developments relating to the security of the US."

Within Western Europe, there were several situations of particular significance.

### A. Germany

The "Review" accepted the estimate that Soviet aims in Europe, in order of importance were: (a) keeping and strengthening control over the "satellite" states; (b) gaining control of Germany as the ultimate key

to Europe; and (c) extending Communist control over the rest of Europe by whatever means best served.

The editors of the "Review" seem to have believed that Soviet strategy immediately after the war had been framed in the belief that the Marxist "revolutionary situation" existing among the conquered Germans could be exploited without serious opposition. At about the time when the "Review" began to be published, the US reaction to Soviet strategy had forced the USSR to revise this estimate and to seek new means of acquiring control of western Germany. The "Review" interpreted Soviet maneuvers in Germany during 1947-50--and particularly the "Berlin Blockade"--according to this concept. The editors thought that if the USSR became convinced that the West could not be dislodged, it would be prepared to accept the partition of Germany as an accomplished fact and to concentrate on the building of a Communist stronghold in East Germany. Toward the end of 1949 the "Review" was becoming convinced that the USSR had reached this conclusion.

B. Austria

Despite surface similarities, the "Review" saw little analogy between the German and Austrian situations. It did not anticipate serious Soviet attempts to dislodge the allies but saw little chance that the Soviets would agree to a treaty that the US could accept.

C. Italy

Until April, 1948, the situation in Italy was followed closely in the "Review" because intelligence indicated that the Italian Communist Party had the capability of returning a majority to Parliament in the

April elections; or if not, of overthrowing the government by force. In either case, but especially in the first, progress toward a fully Communized Italian state would not be difficult and could probably be achieved without internal or external war. Accepted intelligence estimates supported the belief that the consequences of any such development in Italy would be extremely serious for the United States.

After the 1948 elections had returned an anti-Communist majority and had not elicited any show of force by the Communists, the "Review" was interested mainly in Italian economic and social developments affecting US security.

D. France

The French Communist Party, like that of Italy, was in an actual majority, but the "Review" seemed to believe that the centrist parties would be able to retain the balance of political power in the absence of radical developments calling for extreme solutions along Communist or Gaullist lines. Under these circumstances, the need of maintaining the French economy was stressed.

E. The UK

In several issues the "Review" took occasion to reaffirm the great importance to the US of the British alliance. The extent to which British world-wide commitments had, in the past, had the effect of helping to maintain US security interests in various parts of the world was emphasized against declining British financial power which must be restored if Britain were to continue to do its part in the alliance.

-19-

V. Economic and Defense Cooperation in Western Europe

The "Review" began to be published soon after the Marshall Plan had been announced. The editors were able, therefore, to observe the beginnings and development of ERP and NATO. Their general analysis arrived at the conclusion that the Soviet reaction to these developments, while violent in appearance, would be restrained in action through (a) a realization that some such outcome of their own strategy had become inevitable, (b) political factors that made too evident counteraction self-defeating, (c) a desire to avoid moves leading to general war, and (d) the obvious fact that the organization being created in Western Europe, if it could ever become a threat to the USSR, would not attain that status for a long period during which the USSR would have ample opportunity to develop counter measures.

The "Review" believed that the Western European nations could be persuaded to participate in US anti-Communist plans for Europe because the situation left them without much latitude of choice, but predicted that the path of cooperation would become difficult as the organization developed.

III. Eastern Europe

Generally speaking, the editors of the "Review," from the beginning of publication, considered territory east of a line Stettin-Trieste to be within the Soviet sphere of influence and to all intents and purposes

-20-

part of the Soviet Union. During the "Review's" history, three events took place that somewhat modified this concept in different ways: the dying gasps of the regime in Hungary were stifled by the Communists; Czechoslovakia was communized by coup d'etat, and Yugoslavia became a Communist outcast.

The "Review" took the first two events as a matter of course holding that both were inevitable. So far as Hungary was concerned, this view was with the majority, but the coup in Czechoslovakia aroused widespread consternation. The "Review" nevertheless took the stand that the resort to violence in Prague represented nothing more than a Communist choice of methods, calculated in terms of the forthcoming May elections and of the probable effect abroad. To the "Review," the Czech situation was similar to that in Italy with the exceptions that an Italian coup would have had more serious repercussions than one in Eastern Europe and that in Czechoslovakia a coup was facilitated by the presence of the Red Army. Never viewing the Czech move as intended as a Soviet provocation to war, the "Review" at some length assessed its effect in driving hesitant elements in Europe either toward a state of resignation in the face of Communist advances (as in Finland) or toward a Western alliance as in Denmark and Norway.

The "Review" unhesitatingly analyzed the Tito-Cominform controversy as genuine and as meaning that Tito would eventually be forced--while stoutly maintaining the purity of his Communism--toward an alignment

with the West. The editors pointed out, however, that progress in this direction would necessarily be slow and complicated.

As Soviet pressure against Yugoslavia grew more intense, involving apparent military preparations along the border, the "Review" discounted the possibility of an actual Soviet or satellite attack, suggesting rather that the aim was to strengthen Cominformist elements within Yugoslavia, and indirectly to protect Albania.

From time to time, the "Review" tentatively based estimates on widespread opposition to Soviet control believed to exist in Eastern Europe. In particular, this estimate was used as a hypothesis to furnish a partial explanation for apparent weaknesses displayed by the Soviets in certain negotiations over Germany. Evidence of serious unrest not amenable to police-state controls was never sufficient, however, to persuade the "Review" to pose this as a major Soviet problem.

#### IV. The Near and Middle East

In the eyes of the "Review", the Near East was important primarily for negative reasons: that Russian control of the area would be unacceptable in the twentieth century for much the same reasons applicable in the nineteenth, and that Near Eastern oil would represent a disastrous loss to the west as well as a proportionate gain to the USSR. It was also noted that the Near East represented one of the best potential bases of operations against the USSR. For these reasons, the Near East represented a major security interest for the US.

Meanwhile, the region as a whole was in a violent state of flux and seemed to offer unusual opportunities for Soviet exploitation of which the USSR never seemed to take full advantage. Hence the analysis of the Near East, which begins as if it were going to occupy a major part of the "Review," seems forever to be frustrated by the failure of events to happen.

Within the Near East (as then defined) the "Review" identified two areas of major concern: Greece and Palestine.

A. Greece

Soon after the announcement of the "Truman Doctrine" fears over Soviet incursions into Turkey were reduced to a minimum. The effect of US aid in Greece, however, was hardly noticeable for some time to come. Until mid-1949, there always seemed to the "Review" to be a chance that, unless the US chose to liquidate its Greek commitment, with all that such a reversal of policy implied, the only means of eliminating the Communist guerrillas might be through employment of force. So far as the "Review" was concerned, therefore, the situation in Greece in September, 1947, and until after the defection of Yugoslavia, remained extremely critical.

B. Palestine

The situation in Palestine from 1947-1949 was complicated and dangerous. Aside from particular events in the development of the situation--many of which called for interim estimates--the chief insistence of the "Review" was on the point that any move tending to

antagonize the Arab world ran serious risks with respect to the eventual US position in the Near East. The "Review" regarded Soviet strategy respecting Palestine as having retained flexibility and to have left the USSR with much more freedom of action than remained open to the US.

V. The Far East

The Review's Far Eastern analysis is based on the assumption that China would become Communist territory, largely closed to Western influence for an indefinite period. On this basis, the theory is developed that US security interests would have to depend on the development of Japan as the center of a strong strategic position in the offshore perimeter of the continent.<sup>1</sup>

A. China

No issue of the "Review" left much doubt as to the outcome of the Chinese Civil War up to the end of 1948. Communist control of the mainland was then assumed, and attention was focused on developments likely to follow the establishment of Communist China, and on the danger represented by prospective Nationalist occupation of Formosa. The analysis of Soviet motives regarding China to be found in the formal estimates is also reflected in the "Review."

B. Japan

Japan was described (as of April, 1949) as a "purchaseable asset," more or less necessary to purchase (and to guarantee under a treaty probably negotiated without Russian participation) if any US position

**EX/23**

1. This was the same view as that held in contemporary estimates concurred in by the Agencies. See No.

-24-

at all was to be maintained in the Far East. Account was taken of the economic difficulties of supporting Japan that would ensue if the Communists chose to cut off economic access to the mainland.

C. Southeast Asia

The concentration is upon the Indies and Indochina. The Dutch-Indonesian struggle of 1947-1949 is closely followed, the dangerous consequences of a final Dutch resort to force being emphasized. The full extent of the danger to US security involved in French efforts to regain control of Indochina was not recognized until the issue of October, 1949 when an estimate was produced to the effect that French chances of success, either by direct use of military force or indirectly through a "friendly" Vietnamese government were not good; that Indochina might become Communist within the fairly near future depending on the activities of the Communist Chinese when they reached South China, and that Indochina might well prove the key to Southeast Asia, which would become highly vulnerable to Communist developments once the regime had been established in Indochina.

Burma is described as being in considerable danger as a consequence of the weakness and inexperience of the government.

D. Korea

The "Review" warned consistently of the grave danger inherent in withdrawal of US troops. After US troops had been actually withdrawn in the summer of 1949, the "Review" had little more to say on the subject.

-25-

of Korea. It had already made the statement, however, that no South Korean government could long survive without the support of the US occupation.

LIST OF "REVIEW OF THE WORLD SITUATION" AND "REVIEW OF THE WORLD  
SITUATION AS IT RELATED TO THE SECURITY OF THE US" TO 1950,  
WITH DATES

SHORT TITLE NUMBER	DATE
1	September 26, 1947
2	November 14, 1947
3	December 17, 1947
4	January 12, 1948
5	February 12, 1948
3-48	March 10, 1948
4-48	April 8, 1948
5-48	May 12, 1948
6-48	June 17, 1948
7-48	July 14, 1948
8-48	August 19, 1948
9-48	September 16, 1948
10-48	October 20, 1948
11-48	November 17, 1948
12-48	December 16, 1948
0-49	January 19, 1949
1-49	January 19, 1949
2-49	February 16, 1949
3-49	March 16, 1949
4-49	April 20, 1949
5-49	May 17, 1949
6-49	June 15, 1949
7-49	July 20, 1949
8-49	August 17, 1949
9-49	September 14, 1949
10-49	October 19, 1949
11-49	November 16, 1949
12-49	December 21, 1949